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Executive Summary

Lebanon does not have a national refugee law and has not ratified the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or its annex, the 1967 Protocol. The government’s failure to develop a coherent and realistic approach to asylum and migration has had a particularly destabilising effect. Bureaucratic obstacles and a lack of legal protection, coupled with xenophobic rhetoric, threaten to spark periodic violence and human rights violations, exacerbating the vulnerability of refugees in Lebanon.

Since the intensification of the economic and political crisis in Lebanon, along with the Syrian refugee crisis, the phenomenon of illegal escape on boats has worsened, and in 2020 a major tragedy took the lives of dozens after a boat sank near Tripoli. However, many families still find this dangerous experience a viable option to escape the misery and racism in Lebanon. In this escape mechanism by boat, entire families, parents and children, were affected.

Syrians fled to Lebanon following the Syrian war, seeking stability, safety, and a better life away from armed conflict and repression. However, the economic, political, and social crises in Lebanon since 2019 have led the Lebanese government to discriminate against all refugees in Lebanon, accusing them of being the cause of the country’s deteriorating situation. As a consequence, the Lebanese labour market has become increasingly closed to Syrians, with the Lebanese government violating the law and practicing illegal policies against Syrians, fuelling racism and hate speech.

Syrians were stigmatised with stereotypes and often linked to crimes. The hate speech towards the presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is not recent; it started in 2016 with Gebran Bassil and takes many forms. This hate speech toward Syrian refugees could also be seen in the action of some Lebanese municipalities that imposed curfews on Syrians.

More particularly, Syrian children in Lebanon face three challenges, namely the inability of a large proportion of them to receive an education as well as the fact that many of them are immersed in the labour market at an early age. Current data reveals that, as of September 2023, Lebanon hosts close to 470.000 registered school-aged Syrian refugee children and youth between 3–23 years old, based on UNHCR registration. The last and urgent challenge is the registration and civil documentation.

Each year, before the start of the school year, Syrian children are living a discriminatory restriction that will result in tens of thousands of Syrian refugee children being denied their right to education due to restrictions imposed by local authorities and politicians in Lebanon.

On 8 July, Samir Geagea1, head of the Lebanese Forces party, wrote on social media that the Ministry of Education should require all students to present identification papers to register in public and private schools for the 2024-2025 school year. He emphasized that foreign students, implicitly Syrians, should have valid residency permits to be able to enrol in schools. In July and August 2024, at least two Lebanese municipalities, Sin el-fil and al-Kaa, issued statements requiring Syrian children to have Lebanese residency in order to enrol in school. However, due to bureaucratic hurdles and strict criteria imposed on the renewal of Lebanese residency permits, only 20% (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, IACL, 2023) of Syrian refugees have valid residency status.

In the past two years, Lebanese decision-makers have multiplied propositions and strategies to administrate Syrians in Lebanon. The Council of Ministers issued decisions related to refugees from Syria under Decision No. 1, dated 11 September 2023. Due to these crises and refugees, Lebanon has emerged as both a source country for irregular migration for its citizens, residents, and refugees, Lebanese and others, and as a major transit point for migrants and asylum seekers from Lebanon and Syria aiming for Europe. Lebanon’s asylum and migration challenges have been exacerbated by authorities failing to develop a comprehensive strategy to manage the country. This has fuelled the migration economy between the opening of the migration market and the competition between smugglers, on the one hand, and the securitisation of migration by the EU on the other.

Migrants and refugees find themselves caught in a complex web of challenges. Lebanon’s transformation into a transit country for migrants to Europe stems from several important developments such as wars and economic collapse, inconsistent migration policies, widespread violence, and xenophobic attitudes. The growing number of migrants has created a migration ecosystem, with the north becoming its hub.

This study falls within the framework of a fragile environment. It aims to shed light on what Syrian refugees in Lebanon face at governmental and political levels and their exit from Lebanon by illegal migration.

First, after presenting the Lebanese context, this report will attempt to describe the different legal and illegal discrimination patterns and violations among Syrians in Lebanon. Second, it will show how marginalization, violation of laws, and discrimination policies directly lead to a dangerous “exit logic”, namely illegal migration.

The EU-Lebanon Partnership Priorities were formulated in the context of the mass displacement of Syrians after 2011. Migration is referred to as one of the “most pressing challenges” and the document emphasizes the joint policy of both parties to urge the “safe return [of Syrians] to their country of origin”,

considering “the need to create conditions for the safe return of refugees from Syria and displaced Syrians […] following all rules of international humanitarian law and taking into account the interests of the host countries” (Lebanese Republic, 2016, p. 4). The priorities also indicate “that supporting Syrian refugees cannot be done outside the framework of supporting the Lebanese national economy and investing in infrastructure and productive projects”, thus establishing development aid as an essential modality (ibid.). As the European Commission’s statement framing the prioritization strategies makes it clear that, in return for aid, the Lebanese government must “make efforts in the field of socio-economic inclusion of Syrian refugees to improve their living conditions and legal residency strategies” (European Commission, 2016b,pp. 13–14).

The nature of the political relationship in the field of migration shifted with the onset of the Syrian conflict in 2011 and the increase in illegal migration to Europe via sea and land routes that peaked in 2015. This shift was catalysed by the inability to manage migration flows from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This has led the EU to engage in “informal, local and pragmatic decisions” rather than “formal and legally binding cooperation”, a path chosen due to the resistance of MENA countries and to ensure continued cooperation between the EU and its southern neighbours (Seeberg and Zardo, 2020, p. 2).

Finally, this study will show that achieving some concrete steps to help improve the social conditions of

Syrians requires a commitment from everyone, such as international community, non-governmental organisations, and the Lebanese government. The report concludes with recommendations to combat the abuse of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the growth of hate speech on the one hand, and, on the other, the possibility of effectively reducing illegal migration through protection measures and a renewed Euro- Lebanese strategy focused on circular migration, investments, and creative cooperation.

This is an action-research report based on quantitative and qualitative methodology that uses the tools of desk reviews of scientific and grey literature, including government documents as well as government and non-governmental reports. Fieldwork, case selection, and an analysis of the effects of the migration policy were based on CCLS’s legal and advocacy intervention in this field by monitoring violations and illegal boats, providing legal assistance to migrants.